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Correspondence
“Payment of Dividends Before Restoring Impaired Capital”
Editor, The Journal of Accountancy:
Sir: In the March, 1923, issue of The Journal of Accountancy
there appeared a paper written by C. F. Schlatter concerning the Payment
of Dividends before Restoring Impaired Capital.
This article, prepared by Mr. Schlatter, sets forth the proposition
that according to the law at the present time it is illegal to pay dividends
before restoring impaired capital, and further, contains the statement,
“Of course it is understood that a corporation formed to work a wasting
property * * * need pay no attention to depletion and that in such
cases dividends will be paid partly from profits and partly from capital.”
In the May, 1923, issue of The Journal of Accountancy, R. L.
Floyd takes exception to the statement of Mr. Schlatter regarding the
payment of dividends by corporations formed to work a wasting property,
and in his article quoted in detail the Illinois statute which, like the
statutes in a great number of states, prohibits the “payment of dividends
before restoring impaired capital.” His claim appears to be that Mr.
Schlatter has not substantiated his statement by sufficient authority.
Mr. Schlatter, by way of replication, in the same May issue, admits
the existence of the Illinois statute, and further, that Illinois and those
states which have similar statutes have done nothing more than place
upon the statute books a reiteration of the common law. For, Mr. Schlatter
points out, the payment of dividends before restoring capital which has
become impaired has been prohibited by common law long before the
passage of these statutes. He then submits a number of quotations from
leading authors, such as Fletcher, Morawetz, Cook, Clark, and others, who
are recognized as authorities in the field of corporation law, and also
cites a number of cases, all of which seem to lead to the conclusion that
although it is illegal to pay dividends before restoring impaired capital, a
corporation formed to work a wasting property is an exception to this
rule, and therefore does not come under the statutes aforementioned.
Mr. Floyd then replies in the August, 1923, issue of The Journal of
Accountancy to the effect that the text-books on corporation law are not
reliable as a means of ascertaining the authority on such a question, and
further, that the cases cited, and the quotations therefrom, do not hold
squarely upon the point, but contain dicta which is not to be relied upon
in deciding a question of such import. Mr. Floyd in the August issue
adds to the list of cases cited by Mr. Schlatter the case of Lee vs.
Neuchatel Asphalt Company (L. R. 41, Ch. 1), which he contends appears
to be the leading case upon the question of wasting assets as it applies to
the point in issue, but that the facts are too complex, and the decisions
of the various judges are those no well-informed judge of today would
follow.
In the case of Lee vs. Neuchatel Asphalt Company, the facts are very
well set out in the opinion of Cotton, L. J., who says: “The action is
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brought by one ordinary shareholder, on behalf of himself and all the
other ordinary shareholders against the company and the directors, one
of whom has been appointed to represent the preference of shareholders.
In order to understand the nature of the case, it is necessary to state
shortly the nature of the formation of the company. There were six
companies, which were in various ways entitled to the benefit of, and were
working a concession for the carrying on of mines near Neuchatel, which
produced the asphalt. The present company was formed by the amalga
mation of these six companies. The nominal capital of the company is
£1,150,000, divided into £10 shares. No money was paid when the present
company was formed, but the assets of the previous companies were taken
over by the present company, and out of the 115,000 shares in the company
113,000, representing a nominal capital of £1,137,000, were given to the
six old companies, and the concession and the rights which were made
over were taken as being assets to answer that share capital.
“The object of the action is, on behalf of the ordinary shareholders,
to prevent a dividend from being paid out of the excess of the receipts
of the company above its expenditures for the year 1885. On what ground
is that put? The articles justify the declaration of a dividend by a general
meeting without making any reserve for the renewal or replacing of any
lease or of the company’s interest in any property or concession, but that
is said to be ultra vires. The plaintiff puts his case in three ways. The
first point I understand to be this: that a great part of the capital of the
company has been lost. Now, what is meant by ‘capital’? If it is meant
that any part of the assets has been lost, in my opinion that is wrong. I
do not say that no part of the assets has ever been lost, but on the evidence
before us the assets of this company are of greater value than at the time
of the formation of the company in 1873. They then had, it is true, a
concession, but for a shorter period than this one they have now got, and
the royalty was very heavy. Now they have a longer time for the con
cession to run than they had in 1873, and they have got very much more
profitable terms than they had at the first. In my opinion, so far as there
being any loss of assets, the company has now in its possession a larger
amount of assets than it had at the time it was formed. Of course the
present case is very different from that of a company where money has
been paid on all the shares. That case is open to very different con
siderations. Here all that was taken by this company from the first com
panies was their assets, and in my opinion those assets have increased in
value, so that as a matter of fact that first point entirely fails.
“The plaintiff’s second point is that the property of the company is
not now sufficient to make good the share capital; that assets to provide
for that share capital must be made up before any dividend can be
declared; that if dividends are declared without that being done, that is
to be treated as a return and a division of capital amongst the share
holders, and therefore illegal. In my opinion that is entirely wrong. It
is a misapplication of the term ‘return of capital.’ The word ‘capital’ is
used in many senses: one sense is the nominal capital, that capital which
in the case of a company limited by shares is to be defined by the memo
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randum of association. * * * It is impossible that the assets can be
stated in the memorandum of association, but the share capital has to be
stated. Then it is no doubt the law that the capital, in the sense of the
assets of the company obtained for the shares, must not be applied except
for purposes of the company. * * * In my opinion there is no obli
gation in any way imposed upon the company or its shareholders to make
up the assets of the company so as to meet the share capital, where the
shares have been taken under a duly registered contract, which binds the
company to give its shares for certain property without payment in cash.
Shares must be paid up in cash, unless under an agreement duly registered
there is a contract to allot or give the shares for something different.
* * * In my opinion this second point fails as well as the first.
“The third point was to my mind the only one which occasioned any
difficulty. It is said that the concession is a wasting property, and as it
is a wasting property, that dividing its annual proceeds is dividing part
of the capital assets of the company, which are represented by this con
cession. That was pressed upon us, and that is a difficulty, because it is
established, and well established, that you must not apply the assets of
the company in returning to the shareholders what they have paid up on
their shares, or in paying what they ought to have paid up on their shares.
* * * There is nothing in the act which says that dividends are
only to be paid out of profits, * * * there is this firmly fixed: that
capital assets of the company are not to be applied for any purpose not
within the object of the company, and paying dividend is not the object
of the company, the carrying on the business of the company is its object.
If this property were property of another nature, property which would
not be reasonably or properly consumed in providing profit, the case would
stand in a very different position. * * * In considering whether this
is to be treated as an honest division of profit, or as a division of capital
under the guise of declaring a dividend, the court will have regard to the
directions of the articles, although, of course, if those articles authorize
not a mere division of profit but a division of capital (using ‘capital’ in
the proper sense of the word—by which I mean permanent assets, and
assets not to be expended in providing for the profit earned by the com
pany), such a provision will be ultra vires and void. Here there was not
a division of capital under the form of declaration of dividend by a
scheme or plan for dividing assets of the company, the declaration of
dividend was in accordance with the articles, and not contrary to the
general law, and the court ought not to interfere. In my opinion, there
fore, the appeal fails.”
Lindley, L. J., gives an opinion which leads to the same conclusion.
Lopes, L. J., in concurring with Lindley, L. J., and Cotton, L. J., said:
“The capital in an undertaking like this is in its inherent nature wasting.
The scheme of this undertaking is that there should be a gradual
exhaustion of material; the wasting is the business of the company, and
without such gradual exhaustion there would be no revenue. I am unable
to see in this case that either capital or the produce of capital has been
dealt with in a way which is not authorized.”
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This case is perhaps the oldest case in which the courts have attempted
to decide that corporations or companies formed to work wasting property
do not fall within the rule that there cannot be a payment of dividends
before restoring impaired capital. It must be remembered that the case
of Lee vs. Neuchatel, etc., is an English case, and rules and regulations
used in forming such companies are somewhat different from those in
our own country, yet no court could have held more squarely that the
facts constituted an exception to the general rule.
In the case of Excelsior Water & Mining Co. vs. Pierce (Cal. 27,
Pac. 44), Mr. Floyd admits the truth of the quotation from this case by
Mr. Schlatter, but attempts to negative the effect of it by the fact that
the enterprise was only partly a mining one. However, it must be remem
bered that whether an issue is decided affirmatively or negatively, the same
rules of law apply. This case stands squarely upon the proposition that
the word “capital” under the statutes means the actual amount contributed
by the shareholders and forbids the division of capital among the share
holders. But, according to Chief Justice Beatty: “This inhibition, how
ever, did not extend to net proceeds of its mining operations, for a mining
corporation, like any other corporation organized for the purpose of
utilizing a wasting property—a property that can be used only by con
suming it—as a mine, a lease, or a patent, is not deemed to have divided
its capital merely because it has distributed the net proceeds of its mining
operations, although the necessary result is that so much has been sub
tracted from the substance of the estate. It may distribute its net earnings
although the value of the mine is thereby diminished. But it may not sell
the mine, or any part of it, and distribute the proceeds.” It is difficult to
formulate a more concise statement of the law than that contained in
the opinion just quoted, and furthermore, the case of Lee vs. Neuchatel
is cited and its true worth relied upon.
In People, etc., vs. Roberts, Comptroller (51 N. E., 293), it was the
duty of the comptroller to ascertain the amount of capital employed within
the state by corporations conducting part of their business within the
state and part without, and, in order to do this, the comptroller was
compelled to face squarely the fact that the company was organized for
mining purposes, and therefore, fell within the class where capital is
naturally impaired. Although challenged by Mr. Floyd, the question
whether money accumulated by passing dividends and invested in a railroad
outside the state was taxable as capital was decided by determining
whether this so-called profit had to be returned to make up the impaired
capital. Therefore, it must be decided that, as Mr. Schlatter pointed out,
“The decision of the case turned upon the question whether or not the
depletion of a mine must be deducted from income before profits for
dividends emerge. The court held that depletion need not be considered.”
In Boothe vs. Summit Coal Mining Co. (104 Pac. 207), a Washington
case, Mr. Floyd and Mr. Schlatter are agreed upon the facts, but it is
Mr. Floyd’s contention that the issue was as to what constituted “profits”
in the contract between the parties, and not “dividends.” Admitting that
“profits” and “dividends” are not the same, it is well established that
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dividends cannot be declared unless there are profits. A “dividend,” as
defined in the case of People ex rel Pullman Co. vs. Glynn (114 N. Y.
Supp. 460), “is a corporate profit set aside, declared, and ordered by the
directors to be paid to the stockholders upon demand or at a fixed time.”
It is, therefore, obvious that in determining “profits,” the question of
“dividends” must be borne in mind, and the importance of the effect of
declaring “dividends” in a concern where there is a wasting of assets must
be carefully noted.
In citing the case of Mellon, et al. vs. Mississippi Wire Glass Co.
(78 Atl. 710), Mr. Schlatter brings forth the objection from Mr. Floyd
that it “was not on the question of whether certain dividends were legal
but was upon the interpretation of a contract. There was no allegation
that the capital had been impaired.” Admitting there was a contract in
this case that was before the court for interpretation, the court was com
pelled to decide whether or not there would be a violation of the rule
against impairment of capital, for that was the issue, and the court held
that a corporation formed to work a wasting property could pay dividends
before restoring the impaired capital.
In Van Fleet vs. Evangeline Oil Co. (56 So. 343), a Louisiana case,
it appears that prior to the organization of defendant company a quantity
of oil from the wells now owned by defendant company had been placed
in tanks. After the organization of defendant company, a dividend had
been declared, and the plaintiff, a stockholder, asked that a receiver be
appointed for the reason that under the laws of Louisiana it is unlawful
for a corporation to declare dividends out of capital. The company con
tended that the dividend was paid from the proceeds of the sale of oil,
the' product of defendant’s wells, and since the taking of oil from the
wells tended to exhaust the supply, the capital did not have to be replaced.
The court recognized the rule that companies operating mines and other
such other properties may properly declare and pay dividends, although
the properties become exhausted by the working of them, but went on
to say and hold that the oil placed in tanks before the organization of
defendant company could not be considered as being a wasting of the
property, and therefore, was part of the capital. The court used the
argument of the defendant company as the reason for holding that since
the oil placed in the tanks before organization of the company was a
part of the capital, the company had violated the statute against impair
ment of capital, and that a receiver should be appointed.
Mr. Floyd closes his article by saying: “The supposed exception as
to wasting assets appears to have grown out of rather poorly considered
dicta which the courts have put into their opinions while actually deciding
the cases on other grounds. In my opinion the decisions show that, as
matter of law, corporations working wasting assets do not constitute an
exception to the rule that dividends must be paid from profits and not
from capital.”
Perhaps a few words by way of defining “dictum” would not be
amiss. “‘Dictum’ is of two kinds, ‘obiter’ and ‘judicial.’ ‘Obiter dictum’
is an expression of opinion by the court or judge on a collateral question
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not directly involved or mere argument or illustration originating with
him, while ‘judicial dictum’ is an expression of opinion on a question
directly involved, argued by counsel, and deliberately passed on by the
court, though not necessary to a decision. While neither is binding as a
decision, judicial dictum is entitled to much greater weight than the other
and should not be lightly disregarded.” In re Chadwick’s Will (82 Atla.
918, 1919); Words and Phrases, Vol. 2, p. 32. “Wherever a question fairly
arises in the course of a trial, and there is a distinct decision thereon,
the court’s ruling in respect thereto can in no sense be considered as
mere ‘dictum.’ ” New York Central & H. R. R. Co. vs. Price (150 Fed. 330,
332) ; Words and Phrases, Vol. 2, p. 32. The statement that the cases cited
contain nothing but dicta is not based upon a clear and comprehensive
understanding of the manner of deciding issues arising in the course of
a lawsuit. There is a comparatively small amount of dicta in these
cases cited, and the greater amount of that is judicial dicta which is given
considerable weight under the doctrine of stare decisis.
Mr. Floyd in his last reference to the case of Lee vs. Neuchatel, etc.,
states that: “If a board of directors declares a dividend and its declaration
or the books or evidence adduced shows that it is partly from capital it
will come in direct conflict with the statute and no justification will be
found in the cases cited, as they specially hold that in those cases capital
was not impaired * * *.”
True enough, if a dividend is declared partly from profits and partly
from capital, the declaration or the payment, or both, of such dividend
is in direct conflict with the statute of Illinois and similar statutes in
other states, but there are exceptions to a great number of rules, and one
of these exceptions is to the statute referred to. What is the law remains
the law until it is changed by legislative enactment, or until an exception
is established by subsequent court decisions. Admitting again the
existence of the statutes against impairment of capital, an exception is
established by the cases set out as to the declaration of dividends by
corporations formed to work wasting assets, such as mines, leases, patents,
etc., and the exception is to the effect that there may be a declaration
and payment of dividends before restoring the impaired capital. If the
capital were not impaired, such an exception would be unnecessary, for
then there would not be a violation of the statutes. It is to be deplored
that there is not a greater number of cases in which this question has
arisen and has been decided, hut the chief reason may be that the stock
holders in such ventures are satisfied with the returns on their investment
and what appears to them to be a logical and just management.
If this issue were to arise tomorrow, it would not be a certainty that
the court having jurisdiction would decide the case according to the weight
of authority which the cases cited indicate. Neither would it be a cer
tainty that the supreme court of any state would not reverse its previous
decision upon any issue, for the mind of the jurist is awake to the fact
that issues have been wrongly decided and that necessary changes must
come about. Undoubtedly, the jurists hearing the earliest cases on the
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issue before us were keenly aware of the necessity of just such an
exception as we find therein established, and acted accordingly.
After a complete and exhaustive study of the several noted authors
on corporation law and of the cases cited herein, with the idea in mind of
determining whether or not an exception to the general rule against
payment of dividends before restoring impaired capital has been established
by them, there is no other alternative than to hold that where a cor
poration is formed to operate a mine, lease, patent, etc., which is in its
inherent nature wasting, dividends may be declared before impaired capital
is restored.
Yours truly,
Cleveland, Ohio, November 26, 1923.
B. T. Davidson.
Growth of Professional Ethics
Editor, The Journal of Accountancy:
Sir: The reading of Mr. Nau’s paper, Growth of Professional Ethics,
published in the January Journal, has afforded the writer a great deal of
pleasure. Though only a student of accountancy, I am one of a number
the goal of whose aspirations is membership in the Institute, and cannot
refrain from expressing the satisfaction which I experience when I
observe what thought and effort the leaders of the profession are devoting
toward the attainment of the highest ideals for their calling.
We students should feel deeply grateful for these efforts and do all
we possibly can to aid in the accomplishment of whatever has not been
done to bring their efforts to a successful conclusion, and thereafter, to
maintain the high standard which will have been procured.
Personally, I can see the results of the efforts which have been put
forth. Business men and the public generally are daily becoming more
inclined to consider members of the profession, and especially Institute
members, as men of the highest integrity, and, as Mr. Nau says, the
recognition which the treasury department of our government has given
to the Institute’s code of ethics is a big step forward in this work.
Thanking you very kindly for this article as well as for numerous
others which come to me through The Journal, I am,
Yours truly,
Andrews, S. C., January 4, 1924.
C. T. Bell.
James Whitaker Fernley
James Whitaker Fernley, for many years a member of the American
Institute of Accountants and a certified public accountant of Pennsylvania,
died on January 8, 1924. Mr. Fernley was one of the organizers of the
Pennsylvania Institute of Certified Public Accountants in 1897 and aided
in secuning passage of the C. P. A. law in that state, later serving as
president of the state board of examiners. He also served as president
and vice-president of the Pennsylvania Institute. Mr. Fernley contributed
much towards the development of the accounting profession in his state.
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